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Functional neuroimaging has made fundamental contributions to our understanding of brain function. It
remains challenging, however, to translate these advances into diagnostic tools for psychiatry. Promising
new avenues for translation are provided by computational modeling of neuroimaging data. This article re-
views contemporary frameworks for computational neuroimaging, with a focus on forward models linking
unobservable brain states to measurements. These approaches—biophysical network models, generative
models, and model-based fMRI analyses of neuromodulation—strive to move beyond statistical character-
izations and toward mechanistic explanations of neuroimaging data. Focusing on schizophrenia as a
paradigmatic spectrum disease, we review applications of these models to psychiatric questions, identify
methodological challenges, and highlight trends of convergence among computational neuroimaging
approaches. We conclude by outlining a translational neuromodeling strategy, highlighting the importance
of openly available datasets from prospective patient studies for evaluating the clinical utility of computa-
tional models.Introduction
Non-invasive measurements of human brain activity have been
available for almost a century. Following electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) in the 1920s, themore recent developments of posi-
tron emission tomography (PET), magnetoencephalography
(MEG), and fMRI have greatly enriched human neuroscience.
Collectively, these methods have enabled major advances in
our understanding of brain physiology and cognition.
Neurology and psychiatry have welcomed these techniques
enthusiastically, in the hope that non-invasive readouts of brain
function might enable more precise diagnoses and better pre-
dictions for individual patients. While thousands of functional
neuroimaging studies over the past few decades have made
important contributions to elucidating pathophysiological pro-
cesses, the impact on clinical practice has been limited. Success
stories where functional neuroimaging has contributed concrete
diagnostic tools are restricted to neurology, e.g., presurgical
evaluation of epilepsy, differential diagnosis of coma, and
brain-computer-interfaces for locked-in patients. By contrast,
in psychiatry, functional neuroimaging procedures are yet to be
established as diagnostic tools for routine clinical practice.
There are several explanations for this poor translational suc-
cess rate in psychiatry (Kapur et al., 2012). One issue of interest
to this article is that conventional analyses of neuroimaging
data—such as statistical parametric mapping or functional con-
nectivity analyses—are essentially descriptive. While they are
powerful methods to identify potential nodes and connections
of disease-relevant circuits, on their own neither ‘‘blobs’’
(regional activations) nor ‘‘networks’’ (patterns of functional con-
nectivity) provide a mechanistic account of circuit function, i.e.,
what computations are performed and how they are imple-
mented physiologically.716 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.An alternative are mathematical models that describe putative
processes underlying the generation of neuroimaging data.
These are forward models that embody a probabilistic mapping
from unobservable (‘‘hidden’’) brain states—cognitive or neuro-
physiological—to experimental measurements. In other words,
these models seek explanations of data, as opposed to sta-
tistical characterizations. Importantly, some of these forward
models can be inverted, i.e., they allow one to infer hidden brain
states from neuroimaging measurements. This opens up the
possibility of detecting pathophysiological processes in individ-
ual patients (‘‘computational assays’’) (Stephan and Mathys,
2014) and renders thesemodels attractive candidate techniques
for stratifying patients into mechanistically distinct groups.
In this article, we concentrate on three major approaches: (1)
biophysical network models, (2) generative models sensu stricto
of neuroimaging data, and (3) model-based fMRI analyses of
neuromodulation (Figure 1). For simplicity, we will refer to all
these models by the umbrella term ‘‘computational models,’’
appealing to the multiple meanings of ‘‘computation’’ (e.g., infor-
mation processing, or algorithmic—as opposed to analytical—
mathematical treatments). Furthermore, these models represent
different facets of an emerging research program, ‘‘Computa-
tional Psychiatry’’ (Deco and Kringelbach, 2014; Friston et al.,
2014; Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012; Stephan
and Mathys, 2014; Wang and Krystal, 2014).
This article has twomajor aims. First, it provides an overview of
contemporary computational models of neuroimaging data, dis-
cussing what mechanistic insights these models may allow for
and exploring trends of their convergence. Second, we outline
strategies how these models can be applied to clinical questions
such that not only novel pathophysiological insights result
but, eventually, concrete diagnostic procedures. To ensure
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Figure 1. Graphical Overview of Modeling Approaches Discussed in This Paper
The figure contains graphics that has been adapted, with permission, from Deco et al. (2013a) and Chen et al. (2009). See main text for details.
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spectrum disorder—schizophrenia. This is because patho-
physiological theories of schizophrenia highlight themes that
feature prominently in existing computational neuroimaging
frameworks, i.e., connectivity, synaptic plasticity, neuromodula-
tion, and perceptual inference.
Due to space limitations, this article strictly focuses on
‘‘forward modeling’’ approaches of how measured signals
are generated by hidden mechanisms. Other important ap-
proaches—e.g., graph-theoretical analyses or analyses of func-
tional connectivity—are covered by existing excellent reviews
(Buckner et al., 2013; Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Fornito
et al., 2015).
Why Computational Modeling—And What to Focus on?
Standard classification schemes like the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) define schizophrenia as
a syndrome, i.e., a collection of symptoms and phenomenology
over certain periods. The predictive validity of this classification
is limited, and patients with the same diagnosis often exhibit
markedly different clinical trajectories, outcomes, and treatment
responses (Casey et al., 2013; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013; Krystal
and State, 2014). This spectrum nature of schizophrenia stems
from at least three sources. First, a polygenetic basis, with a
large number of genome variants conveying risk (Schizophrenia
Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2014);
the functional consequences of these genetic variants, however,
may converge on only a small set of intracellular signaling cas-
cades and synaptic processes (Krystal and State, 2014; Stephanet al., 2006). Second, environmental factors such as infections,
nutrition and stress interact with risk-conveying genes and
modulate their expression (gene-by-environment interactions)
(van Os et al., 2008). Third, environmental factors can also affect
pathophysiological processes directly, e.g., immunological,
metabolic, and hormonal factors can alter NMDA receptor
(NMDAR) function (Stephan et al., 2009).
Collectively, these considerations imply that different patho-
physiological pathways can be affected in different combina-
tions across patients. The ensuing lack of pathophysiological
interpretability of the label ‘‘schizophrenia’’ under current diag-
nostic schemes has major consequences for clinical practice,
such as the necessity of resorting to trial-and-error treatment
and the difficulties of stratifying patients for clinical studies (Ka-
pur et al., 2012). Only very few physiologically defined subgroups
of patients with psychotic symptoms can presently be identified
through clinical tests, e.g., patients suffering from neurosyphilis
or NMDAR antibodies.
Computational modeling may help addressing this problem
by inferring disease mechanisms from non-invasive readouts
of circuit function. In analogy to diagnostic procedures in internal
medicine, it is the functional status quo of disease-relevant cir-
cuits that may prove crucial to assign patients to pathophysio-
logical subgroups and to derive individual treatment predictions.
However, what are the most relevant pathophysiological pro-
cesses and circuits that should inform the development
of computational models? Clearly, more than one theory of
schizophrenia exists and could provide guidance here. For
example, long-standing theories have focused on dopamineNeuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 717
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Review(DA), neurodevelopment, NMDARs, GABA receptors, and exci-
tation-inhibition (E-I) balance, respectively (Gonzalez-Burgos
and Lewis, 2012; Howes and Kapur, 2009; Insel, 2010; Lisman
et al., 2008; Uhlhaas, 2013). Regardless of their specific propo-
sitions, however, a shared perspective among these theories is
that schizophrenia is essentially a network disease (Harrison
and Weinberger, 2005), where a primary pathology at the level
of synapses leads to maladaptive reconfigurations of circuits
for learning and perceptual inference (Stephan et al., 2006).
Viewing schizophrenia as a network disease has a long tradi-
tion dating back to the early 20th century when Wernicke (1906)
and Bleuler (1911) stressed structural and cognitive deficits of
functional integration in schizophrenia, respectively. With the
advent of neuroimaging, observations of abnormally distributed
activity and functionally disconnected areas paved the way for
the concept of ‘‘dysconnectivity’’ in schizophrenia (Andreasen,
1999; Friston and Frith, 1995). This widely adopted view refers
to disturbances of functional integration that manifest as
abnormal connectivity and oscillatory activity (Buckholtz and
Meyer-Lindenberg, 2012; Bullmore et al., 1997; Friston, 1998;
Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011; Stephan et al., 2006; Uhlhaas,
2013).
Notably, dysconnectivity could result from a variety of synap-
tic mechanisms. For example, theories differ in their relative
emphasis on abnormalities of glutamatergic, GABAergic, dopa-
minergic, and cholinergic signaling (Gonzalez-Burgos and
Lewis, 2012; Lisman et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2009). This mo-
tivates the construction of computational models for clarifying
how alterations in different ionotropic and metabotropic recep-
tors impact on functional coupling as assessed by neuroimag-
ing.
In addition to physiology, however, models are required that
link neuronal to computational processes and explain how
aberrant cognition arises from circuit dysfunction. One theory
that provides a framework for constructing such models is the
dysconnection hypothesis (Friston, 1998; Stephan et al., 2006,
2009; Adams et al., 2013). It postulates that, physiologically, dys-
connectivity in schizophrenia results from abnormal NMDAR-
neuromodulator interactions (NNI)—i.e., aberrant regulation of
NMDAR-dependent synaptic plasticity by DA or acetylcholine
(ACh)—with failures of perceptual inference as a computational
consequence. More specifically, the dysconnection hypothesis
and conceptually related concepts of psychosis (Corlett et al.,
2011; Fletcher and Frith, 2009) build on the ‘‘Bayesian brain’’
notion that the brain constructs a model of the world in order
to predict its sensory inputs and infer on the environmental
causes of its sensations (Dayan et al., 1995; Doya et al., 2011).
One particular variant of this Bayesian view is the ‘‘free-energy
principle’’ (Friston, 2010) that postulates that the brain’s central
function is to minimize surprise, by updating beliefs and/or
choosing actions that lead to expected sensory inputs. Physio-
logically, Bayesian message passing is typically assumed to
rest on glutamatergic signaling of predictions and prediction er-
rors (PEs) via cortical long-range connections, weighted by esti-
mates of precision (inverse uncertainty) that may be encoded by
slow changes in release of neuromodulatory transmitters like DA
or ACh (Corlett et al., 2010; Friston et al., 2012). Impairments of
these processes lead to abnormal perceptual inference that in718 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.turn may explain a range of salient symptoms in schizophrenia,
e.g., hallucinations or delusions, as discussed below.
This brief overview has outlined target processes for computa-
tional models suggested by current pathophysiological theories
of schizophrenia. We now turn to different classes of computa-
tional models that may prove useful for inferring these putative
disease processes from neuroimaging data.
Biophysical Network Models of Neuroimaging Data
Over the last decades, a variety of single-neuron models have
been developed that describe the dynamics of ion channel con-
ductances, membrane potential, and firing rate. A straightfor-
ward way of constructing neuronal population models are
‘‘direct simulations’’ (Omurtag et al., 2000), i.e., simulating a large
number of individual neurons and linking them via local synaptic
connection rules. The resulting neuronal ensembles can be
treated as distinct nodes that are linked by anatomical long-dis-
tance connections to yield a large-scale biophysical network
model (BNM). Simulated neuronal population activity in each of
the regions can then be fed into a forward model that predicts
regional fMRI, M/EEG, or PET measurements.
Some BNMs of fMRI data have used the strategy of ‘‘direct
simulations,’’ usually considering on the order of 103 neurons
per network node (Deco and Jirsa, 2012). Most present BNMs
of neuroimaging data, however, do not pursue a ‘‘direct simula-
tion’’ approach. This is not only because of the high computa-
tional costs. First, models with large numbers of biophysically
detailed single neurons are too complex for parameter estima-
tion; this necessitates fixing model parameters a priori, usually
referring to electrophysiological studies in animals. However,
many biophysical and morphological parameters show pro-
nounced variability within and across species (Ko¨tter and Feizel-
meier, 1998; Marder and Goaillard, 2006). Furthermore, in large-
scale models it is difficult to identify the decisive mechanisms
underlying a particular empirical measurement: both simulations
with systematic exploration of parameter space and analytical
treatments become impractical.
For these reasons, most BNMs of neuroimaging data have
sought lower-dimensional representations of neuronal mecha-
nisms that strike a balance between biophysical realism and
model complexity. This typically rests on ‘‘mean-field’’ reduc-
tion, a concept from statistical physics that describes system
behavior in terms of average effects resulting from the probabi-
listic interactions of many individual components (e.g., tempera-
ture and pressure of a gas). In the context of neuronal population
models, instead of accounting for all interactions between indi-
vidual neurons, the mean-field approach only considers interac-
tions between the statistical moments of neuronal populations
(Freeman, 1975). In other words, neurons of one population are
only influenced by the mean activity of another population (and
possibly higher order moments such as variance). Effectively,
this perspective transforms the representation of neuronal dy-
namics from the microscopic (single neuron) to the mesoscopic
(neuronal population) level.
The last decade has seen important advances in mean-field
formulations of neuronal population models. A systematic over-
view and nomenclature can be found in Deco et al. (2008) who
adopt a population density perspective, conceptualizing the
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form of a flow-diffusion process. Considering the statistical mo-
ments of this density corresponds to a ‘‘dynamic mean field’’
approach; considering only the mean activity of each population
results in ‘‘neural mass’’ models. Finally, ‘‘neural field’’ models
capture the spread of activity across the brain (Jirsa and Haken,
1996; Robinson et al., 2001).
These advances have paved the way for tractable large-scale
BNMs of neuroimaging data. The general strategy consists of
three steps (Figure 1): (1) representing each network node as a
neural mass or mean-field model of local neuronal populations
(e.g., excitatory and inhibitory neurons within a cortical area);
(2) linking these nodes by long-range connections; and (3)
feeding the resulting network activity into an observation model
that predicts regional fMRI, M/EEG, or PET data. (It is worth
noting that such models possess a likelihood function and allow
one to generate synthetic data; this, however, does not yet
render them ‘‘generative models’’ in a statistical sense. This
distinction will be revisited below.)
For M/EEG, the history of BNMs goes back to neural mass
models of event-related potentials (ERPs) (Freeman, 1975; Jan-
sen and Rit, 1995; Valdes et al., 1999). Recent BNMs have
covered whole-brain activity, demonstrating, for example, the
importance of conduction delays for explaining distributed oscil-
lations in the ‘‘resting state’’ (Nakagawa et al., 2014). Neural field
models have also been applied to empirical M/EEG data, eluci-
dating general principles of brain dynamics, such as multistabil-
ity and scale-invariance (Freyer et al., 2011, 2012), and providing
important insights into disorders such as epilepsy (Breakspear
et al., 2006).
The importance of conductance delays in M/EEG models and
the high spatial resolution of fMRI data highlight the need of
BNMs for accurate information on anatomical long-range con-
nections. This information can be obtained from human diffu-
sion-weighted imaging (DWI) or from the CoCoMac database
of tract tracing studies in the macaque monkey (for review, see
Stephan, 2013). Neither approach is without uncertainty: while
DWI data cannot resolve directionality of connections and has
limited resolution, CoCoMac rests on mapping procedures that
integrate data across different parcellation schemes (and, for hu-
man studies, species).
Despite this limitation, BNMs of M/EEG and fMRI data have
become important tools for investigating the mechanisms that
link microscopic (single neurons), mesoscopic (areas), and
macroscopic (networks) levels of description. For fMRI, initial
BNMs focused on task-specific networks (Husain et al., 2004);
subsequent models have encompassed the entire brain, using
parcellations with up to 103 regions. Thesemodels have typically
focused on the ‘‘resting state,’’ i.e., unconstrained cognition in
the absence of sensory perturbations (Ghosh et al., 2008; Honey
et al., 2007). Collectively, these studies provided important in-
sights into how large-scale dynamics are constrained by the
anatomical ‘‘skeleton’’ of long-range structural connectivity
(Deco et al., 2013a).
Despite all simplifications, the models discussed so far are still
too complex for parameter estimation, and the applications
described above used simulations under fixed parameters. Infer-
ring subject-specific parameters from neuroimaging data, how-ever, is crucial for future diagnostic applications of BNMs
(Woolrich and Stephan, 2013). While this motivates the simpler
generative models discussed below, recent BNMs have begun
to acquire a limited capacity of estimating parameters from
empirical data. In particular, Deco et al. (2013b) derived a linear-
ized simplification of the model by Wong and Wang (2006), al-
lowing for the estimation of a global parameter (that uniformly
scales connection strengths across the brain) from empirical
fMRI data.
A notable example of the rapid development of large-scale
BNMs for neuroimaging data is the ‘‘Virtual Brain’’ project (Jirsa
et al., 2010; Sanz-Leon et al., 2015). This open-source software
provides a platform for constructing whole-brain models, allow-
ing for the combination of different neural mass and neural field
models with different measures of long-range connectivity
(CoCoMac or human DWI data). Using realistic head models
and different forward models, fMRI and M/EEG signals can be
simulated simultaneously from the same underlying neuronal
model (http://thevirtualbrain.org).
Applications to Clinical Questions
While BNMs of neuroimaging data have developed rapidly, their
application to diseases has only begun recently. In schizo-
phrenia, working memory (WM) is an attractive target for bio-
physical modeling: it is frequently impaired, and the underlying
circuit mechanisms are known in great detail (Brunel and
Wang, 2001; Durstewitz et al., 2000; Lisman et al., 1998). One
key mechanism concerns dopaminergic regulation of glutama-
tergic receptor conductances in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC). In brief, a DA-mediated increase in the conduc-
tance of NMDARs, relative to those of AMPARs, is necessary
to switch pyramidal cells into a high-frequency firing mode that
is critically required for and time-locked to memory mainte-
nance. This is of relevance for schizophrenia, given that the
interaction of NMDARs and DA is a central theme in pathophys-
iological theories of schizophrenia (Laruelle et al., 2003; Stephan
et al., 2006).
Recent BNM studies of WM have used the NMDAR antagonist
ketamine—an established pharmacological model of schizo-
phrenia symptoms (Corlett et al., 2011)—in healthy volunteers.
These studies were particularly interested in disturbances of
E-I balance, given that NMDAR antagonism may exert a prefer-
ential loss of excitatory drive at GABAergic interneurons, leading
to disinhibition of pyramidal cells (Homayoun and Moghaddam,
2007). A first study used a circuit model of spatial WM in DLPFC
that suggested that ketamine would reduce lateral inhibition and
hence decrease the selectivity of stimulus representations; the
ensuing predictions about ketamine effects onWMperformance
were verified in behavioral experiments (Murray et al., 2014). A
second study using fMRI found that ketamine disrupted func-
tional connectivity between fronto-parietal areas and the default
mode network (DMN) duringWM (Anticevic et al., 2012). Further-
more, ketamine reduced DMN deactivation during the task; a
BNM comprising fronto-parietal and DMN modules suggested
that this could be explained by local disinhibition and the result-
ing decrease in sensitivity to long-range inputs.
BNMs have also been used in three recent fMRI patient
studies. The first compared adolescents with early-onsetNeuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 719
Figure 2. Application of a BNM to fMRI Data from Patients with Schizophrenia
(A) Voxels in medial PFCwith enhanced global connectivity at 12-month follow-up compared to baseline. Connection strengths for healthy controls are shown for
comparison.
(B) BNM with two key parameters: local coupling (w) within nodes and long-range global coupling (G) between 66 nodes.
(C) Simulations showed enhanced global connectivity when increasing either w or G. Adapted from Anticevic et al. (2015), with permission.
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regions) informed by individual DWI data (Cabral et al., 2013).
While structural network properties did not differ significantly
when correcting for multiple comparisons, applying the BNM
to the fMRI data indicated a trend toward reduced global
coupling in patients; this would explain lower small-world indices
of functional connectivity in schizophrenia (Lynall et al., 2010).
However, a second BNM study of adult patients with schizo-
phrenia (Yang et al., 2014) suggested that reduced functional
connectivity may not occur universally across the brain. This
study focused on functional connectivity of the DLPFC, finding
‘‘hyperconnectivity’’ in schizophrenia; a result mimicked in the
BNM by increasing either within-node or inter-node coupling.
Importantly, this study showed that global signal regression dur-
ing fMRI data preprocessing decisively affected conclusions
about global coupling estimates in schizophrenia (cf. Fornito
and Bullmore, 2015).
The same BMN was used by a longitudinal fMRI study of 129
patients with early-stage schizophrenia who were scanned
prior to medication; 25 patients were followed up after 1 year
(Anticevic et al., 2015). Focusing on medial prefrontal (mPFC)
cortex, its coupling estimates with the rest of the brain were
mostly increased (for other areas, there was a mixed pattern of
increased and decreased connectivity). Importantly, mPFC hy-
perconnectivity normalized after one year and predicted positive720 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.(but not negative) symptoms. As Yang et al. (2014), Anticevic
et al. (2015) found that increasing either global or local coupling
parameters mimicked the observed pattern of prefrontal
hyperconnectivity. They interpreted this as altered E-I balance
in early-stage schizophrenia that normalized in parallel to symp-
tom improvements over time (Figure 2).
Generative Models of Neuroimaging Data
While BNMs offer a detailed representation of (patho)physiolog-
ical mechanisms, a central challenge for clinical utility is the
difficulty to estimate these mechanisms from subject-specific
measurements. This motivates considering a different class of
models, so-called ‘‘generative models’’ that represent the joint
probability of data andmodel parameters (Figure 1). They require
two things: a prior distribution, indicating the expected range of
parameter values and a likelihood function. The latter encodes
a probabilistic forward model, quantifying the probability of
obtaining a particular observation (e.g., pattern of regional
BOLD signals) as a function of the model parameters (e.g.,
synaptic connection strengths). Once likelihood and prior are
specified, it is possible, in principle, to ‘‘invert’’ the model and
compute the posterior probability of the parameters given the
measured data; this fully characterizes amechanism (parameter)
of interest, providing both its expected value and one’s uncer-
tainty about it.
Figure 3. Summary of the Classical
Deterministic DCM for fMRI
For mathematical details, see Friston et al. (2003)
and Stephan et al. (2007).
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model structure: by integrating out the dependency on model
parameters, one obtains the model evidence, a principled index
of the trade-off between a model’s accuracy and complexity.
The model evidence provides a basis for Bayesian model selec-
tion and averaging (Stephan et al., 2007; Penny et al., 2010).
These procedures allow for comparing and integrating alterna-
tive model formulations (e.g., whether a connection exists, or
whether a particular form of plasticity is present).
Importantly, in neuroimaging, neuronal activity is not observed
directly; instead, the measurements reflect a (potentially compli-
cated) transformation of neuronal activity. This means the likeli-
hood function takes on the hierarchical form of a state-space
model and distinguishes between a hidden neuronal level and
an observation level (Figure 3). This formulation as a hierarchical
generative model is critical for inference on neuronal processes
and disambiguating them from potential confounds. For
example, in fMRI, regional variations in neurovascular coupling
can severely confound inference on neuronal connectivity (David
et al., 2008).
Dynamic Causal Modeling
The idea of using a hierarchical generative model to infer on
neuronal processes from neuroimaging data was first imple-
mented by dynamic causal modeling (DCM) for fMRI (Friston
et al., 2003). The original formulation rests on a low-order Taylor
approximation and describes the dynamics of interacting
neuronal populations by bilinear differential equations via threeNeuron 87types of mechanisms: experimental per-
turbations (e.g., sensory stimuli) that
‘‘inject’’ activity into the system, fixed syn-
aptic connections by which this activity
is conveyed to target populations, and
modulatory inputs that invoke contextual
changes of connection strengths (e.g.,
short-termplasticity andneuromodulatory
influences) (see Figure 3). Subsequently,
the neuronal model in DCM for fMRI has
been extended in several ways, including
non-linear (Stephan et al., 2008) and sto-
chastic differential equations (Li et al.,
2011). The latter can model endogenous
fluctuations in neuronal activity and ex-
tends the applicability of DCM to ‘‘resting
state’’ fMRI data. The predicted neuronal
dynamics are linked to region-wise BOLD
signals via a nonlinear hemodynamic
model (Stephan et al., 2007). Notably, the
same hemodynamic model has been
incorporated into most BNMs of fMRI
data described above.DCM represented the first complete generative model of
BOLD data that spanned both neuronal and hemodynamic levels
and was sufficiently simple that it could be inverted. While this is
usually done with variational Bayesian techniques, alternative
schemes based onMarkov chainMonte Carlo (MCMC) sampling
or Gaussian processes are currently under development.
Compared to the BNMs discussed above, current DCMs are
restricted to smaller subgraphs of brain-wide connectivity, typi-
cally with up to ten nodes, in order tomaintain feasibility of model
inversion.
By replacing the hemodynamic forwardmodel with an electro-
magnetic one, DCM can be generalized from fMRI to electro-
physiological data. The rich temporal information in M/EEG
measurements allows for constructing DCMs with more detailed
neuronal representations and for building bridges to the BNMs
discussed above. The first DCM for M/EEG data by (David
et al., 2006) was based on a classical neural massmodel (Jansen
and Rit, 1995). This DCM describes how cortical areas—each
represented by a macrocolumn composed of pyramidal cells,
excitatory, and inhibitory interneurons—interact through long-
range glutamatergic connections whose laminar patterns follow
neuroanatomical rules of cortical hierarchies. This allows for
considerably more fine-grained physiological inference than
DCM for fMRI, e.g., on the relative strength of glutamatergic
versus GABAergic transmission (Moran et al., 2011a).
Subsequent developments of DCM for M/EEG have made
further strides toward physiological interpretability, for example,
using a conductance-based formulation that distinguishes, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 721
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Figure 4. A Prototype Computational Assay for Inferring DA Effects on Glutamate Receptor Conductances
Adapted, with permission, from Moran et al. (2011b).
(A) A prefrontal microcircuit DCMwith three cell classes and receptor types was used to model MEG data of healthy subjects performing aWM task twice, under
L-Dopa or placebo.
(B) Differences in parameter estimates across drug conditions. In line with previous data, administration of L-Dopa reduced AMPAR conductance (g1,3) and
enhanced the sensitivity (nonlinearity) of NMDARs (a).
(C) Changes in AMPAR conductance (left) and NMDAR nonlinearity (right) each significantly (p < 0.05) correlated with drug-induced change in performance.
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i.e., AMPA, NMDA, and GABAA receptors (Marreiros et al.,
2010). Pharmacological validation studies have demonstrated
that this model is capable of pathophysiologically relevant infer-
ence, for example, the identification of DA-induced changes in
NMDAR conductance from MEG data (Moran et al., 2011b)
(Figure 4).
Other Generative Models
Beyond DCM, various generative models of neuroimaging data
have been proposed in recent years. These include fMRI models
of dynamic effective connectivity (Havlicek et al., 2011) or state-
space models of M/EEG data that capture neuronal interactions
by multivariate autoregressive formulations (Olier et al., 2013;
Fukushima et al., 2015). Finally, an entirely different class of
generative models aims at explaining trial-by-trial variations in
M/EEG responses; we turn to these below.
Application to Clinical Questions
Generative models have been used in numerous studies on
schizophrenia, guided by the various pathophysiological con-
cepts described above. Due to space constraints, here we focus
exclusively on studies of perceptual inference; this is a theme at
the core of the dysconnection hypothesis and related concepts
(Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Stephan et al.,
2006) that provides a bridge to Bayesian brain theories like pre-
dictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999). In brief, predictive coding
posits that the brain constructs a generative model of its sensory722 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.inputs and updates its beliefs about the environmental causes of
its sensations by inverting this model (Figure 5). Belief updating
rests on message passing between hierarchically related
neuronal populations, such that each population sends predic-
tions about expected input to the next lower level and, following
sensory input, a prediction error (PE) to the next higher level; this
PE is then used to update subsequent top-down predictions.
This recurrent message passing serves to minimize PE at all
levels. Importantly, the impact of PEs is context-dependent
and varies with their relative precision (inverse uncertainty). For
example, PEs arising from vague (uncertain) predictions signal
less necessity for belief adjustment than PEs based on precise
predictions. Overall, this suggests a simple classification of
computational causes why perceptual inference could break
(abnormal computation of PEs, predictions, or precision-weight-
ing) and offers potential explanations for concrete clinical symp-
toms that can be tested with computational models (Adams
et al., 2013; Jardri and Dene`ve, 2013).
Importantly, these computational variables can be linked to
physiological processes (Figure 5): PE and prediction signaling
is assumed to be mediated by glutamatergic signaling via bot-
tom-up/forward (AMPAR and NMDAR) and top-down/backward
(NMDAR) connections in cortical hierarchies (Corlett et al., 2011;
Friston, 2005a; Stephan et al., 2006). Precision-weighting might
be implemented by the postsynaptic gain of PE-encoding supra-
granular pyramidal cells, under the influence of slow changes in
neuromodulatory transmitter levels such as DA or ACh (Friston
et al., 2012; Moran et al., 2013). On the other hand, synaptic
Figure 5. An Overview of Predictive Coding Architectures
Figures are reproduced, with permission from the respective publishers.
(A) Predictive coding (PC) assumes that the brain constructs a hierarchical generativemodel of its sensory inputs and infers their causes bymodel inversion. Belief
updating rests on message passing between hierarchically related neuronal populations: each population sends predictions about expected input to the next
lower level and prediction error (PE) to the next higher level (Rao and Ballard 1999). This recurrent message passing serves to minimize PE at all levels.
(B) A putative neuronal implementation of PC (Friston 2005a): upper and lower circles represent neural units encoding PE (x) and the posterior expectation of
causes (f), respectively.
(C) A more refined version assigns PEs and expectations to supra- and infragranular pyramidal cells, respectively, and distinguishes causal states (v) and hidden
states (x); while the former connect hierarchical levels, the latter represent the temporal dynamics of expectations and endow the model with memory (Friston
et al., 2012).
(D) Proposed neurobiological components of PC architectures (Corlett et al., 2011). PEs are assumed to be signaled by fast glutamatergic (and in some circuits
GABAergic) transmission, predictions via NMDARs, and precision by neuromodulatory transmitters (DA, ACh).
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with GABAergic mechanisms (Adams et al., 2013); this provides
a link to theories emphasizing disturbances of E-I balance in
schizophrenia (Uhlhaas, 2013).
The idea that abnormal perceptual inference results from de-
ficiencies of the brain’s generative model (i.e., aberrant signaling
of precision-weighted PEs and predictions via forward and
backward connections) can be tested empirically. This rests on
using generative models (of neuroimaging data) to determine
changes in effective connectivity under experimental variations
of the difficulty of perceptual inference. An example is the ‘‘hol-
low mask’’ illusion where a concave mask of a human face is
perceived as a normal convex face. As many other illusions, it
can be understood as arising from the biasing influence of a
strong prior (here: that faces are convex objects) during the
inversion of the brain’s model of sensory inputs. Intriguingly, pa-
tients with schizophrenia are, on average, considerably less sus-
ceptible to this illusion than healthy controls (Dima et al., 2009).
Two separate fMRI and EEG studies examined potential mecha-
nisms for this phenomenon: applying structurally analogousDCMs to fMRI and EEG data, these two studies consistently
found a strengthening of bottom-up connections and diminished
top-down connectivity in patients, consistent with the notion
of reduced precision of predictions about facial stimuli (Dima
et al., 2009, 2010). Notably, weakening of top-down predictions
may explain a range of perceptual alterations in schizophrenia
(Notredame et al., 2014) and may also play a role in the initial
formation of delusions (Schmack et al., 2013).
Another paradigm that is commonly interpreted from a predic-
tive coding perspective is the mismatch negativity (MMN), an
event-related potential (ERP) elicited by unpredicted sensory
stimuli (‘‘deviants’’). Reduced MMN amplitudes are one of the
most consistently found electrophysiological anomalies in
schizophrenia (Umbricht and Krljes, 2005). Initial DCM studies
on healthy volunteers showed that both forward and backward
connection strengths change at the presentation of a deviant, re-
flecting the bottom-up signaling of PEs and ensuing adaptation
of top-down predictions (for review, see Garrido et al., 2009).
Subsequent DCM studies in patients with schizophrenia have
demonstrated striking alterations. For visual MMN, FogelsonNeuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 723
Figure 6. Computational fMRI Studies of
Neuromodulation
Figures are reproduced, with permission from the
respective publishers. Please see individual papers
for significance levels.
(A–C) Midbrain activity reflects precision-weighted
sensory PEs (Iglesias et al., 2013) (A), reward PEs
(Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2011) (B), and precision (of
beliefs about the value of policies) (Schwartenbeck
et al., 2014) (C).
(D and E) Encoding of expected uncertainty (op-
erationalized by probability PEs) in the septal part
of the cholinergic basal forebrain (Iglesias et al.,
2013) (D) and of unexpected uncertainty in the lo-
cus coeruleus (Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013) (E).
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Dima et al. (2010), a marked reduction of top-down connections
in the visual hierarchy. For auditory MMN, the DCM results by
Dima et al. (2012) suggested that patients exhibited both
abnormal forward and backward effective connectivity, accom-
panied by reduced postsynaptic gain of pyramidal cells in pri-
mary auditory cortex.
Pharmacological studies in healthy volunteers have played
an important part in elucidating the mechanisms underlying
MMN deficits in schizophrenia. This has highlighted the roles
of NMDARs and ACh. For example, the NMDAR antagonist keta-
mine reduces MMN amplitude in healthy volunteers, similar to
schizophrenia, and individual MMN amplitude predicts psycho-
sis-proneness under ketamine (Umbricht et al., 2002). Applying
DCM to ERPs acquired under ketamine versus placebo, Schmidt
et al. (2013) found that ketamine significantly reduced the
PE-induced plasticity of forward connections in auditory cortex.
A DCM study of MEG data acquired under the acetylcholines-
terase inhibitor galantamine suggested that the observed
increase in MMN amplitude resulted from ACh enhancing the
precision of bottom-up signaling in the auditory hierarchy by
increasing the postsynaptic gain of supragranular pyramidal
cells (Moran et al., 2013).
An alternative generative modeling framework of M/EEG data
is worth mentioning in the context of MMN. This approach con-
centrates on trial-by-trial responses and views across-trial
fluctuations in MMN amplitude as a reflection of Bayesian belief
updating. It rests on hierarchical generative models where a
hidden layer of computational processes is linked to EEG
channels through a linear forward model. Under this framework,
competing hypotheses that specific computational variables
might be encoded by MMN amplitude can be disambiguated
by model comparison. Applying this strategy to a somatosen-
sory MMN paradigm, Ostwald et al. (2012) found that Bayesian
surprise (simply speaking, adjustments of model predictions
in response to new observations) better explained trial-wise724 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.MMN amplitudes than classical interpre-
tations of MMN as change detection. In
the auditory domain, Lieder et al. (2013)
compared 13 alternative implementations
of five major MMN theories. Analogous to
Ostwald et al. (2012), they found that
Bayesian belief updating proved superiorto classical interpretations of MMN in terms of change detection,
adaptation or novelty, and adjustments of model predictions
provided the best explanation for trial-wise MMN amplitudes.
Model-Based fMRI: Computational Models of
Neuromodulation
The previous sections have described computational models
of neuroimaging data with decreasing complexity, from whole-
brain BNMs to DCMs of circumscribed circuits. This section
reduces the spatial scope even further and considers model-
based explanations of single-voxel fMRI data. These rest on
generative models of behavior (e.g., trial-wise choices or reac-
tion times), yielding trajectories of computational states; these
can, in turn, be coupled to a forward (convolution) model and
used as regressors in general linear model analyses of voxel-
wise fMRI data (Figure 1). This two-step procedure differentiates
this approach from the models discussed above and provides a
bridge between two types of observations, behavior and brain
activity.
This approach—pioneered by O’Doherty et al. (2003) and
often referred to as ‘‘model-based fMRI’’—has been used
successfully in many studies, often employing reinforcement
learning (RL) or Bayesian models, to determine which circuits
implement a particular computational process. Here, we focus
on one aspect of particular interest for potential clinical applica-
tions. This is the notion that release of modulatory transmitters—
e.g., DA from midbrain neurons, norepinephrine from locus co-
eruleus, or ACh from basal forebrain—may encode the values
of specific computational variables (Figure 6).
This idea originated from the seminal observation that the tem-
poral course of phasic DA release resembled the trajectory of
reward PEs as predicted by RL models (Schultz et al., 1997).
This view nicely connected the role of PEs as ‘‘teaching signals’’
for learning to DA’s involvement in modulating synaptic plasticity
and triggered the question whether reliable in vivo estimates
of neuromodulatory transmitter release in humans could be
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models of behavior (D’Ardenne et al., 2008; Du¨zel et al., 2009).
As key regulators of synaptic plasticity, neuromodulatory
transmitters drive (mal)adaptive changes of neuronal circuits
and thus play a key role in pathophysiological theories of almost
any psychiatric disease (Montague et al., 2012). Another reason
for the interest in computational approaches to neuromodulation
(Dayan, 2012) is that most drugs used in psychiatry target either
synthesis, metabolism, or postsynaptic binding of neuromodula-
tory transmitters. This suggests that computational assays infer-
ring neuromodulatory processes from neuroimaging data might
prove useful for treatment predictions in individual patients (Ste-
phan and Mathys, 2014).
Initial model-based fMRI studies of neuromodulation mainly
used conditioning paradigms and RL models to demonstrate
that reward PEs explained human fMRI responses in the dopa-
minergic midbrain or dopaminoceptive regions like the ventral
striatum (e.g., D’Ardenne et al., 2008; O’Doherty et al., 2003;
but see Klein-Flu¨gge et al., 2011). There are several reasons,
however, why DA is unlikely to be restricted to ‘‘classical’’ PEs
about primary reward, as examined by Pavlovian and operant
conditioning paradigms. First, DA midbrain neurons show pro-
nounced heterogeneity with regard to neurodevelopment, con-
nectivity, and electrophysiology (Roeper, 2013). Furthermore,
they contribute to reward-unrelated cognitive processes, such
as WM (Matsumoto and Takada, 2013), and may encode PEs
about purely sensory events (Iglesias et al., 2013). Third, what
constitutes a ‘‘reward’’ is context-dependent and depends
on the individual’s internal model and the subjective beliefs it
rests upon. Finally, DA release fluctuates at different timescales,
e.g., tonic versus phasic responses. This suggests that DA neu-
rons may emit a multiplexed signal reflecting several computa-
tional variables concurrently (Hiroyuki, 2014).
Other quantities that may be reflected by DA release include
novelty (Du¨zel et al., 2009) and uncertainty or its inverse, preci-
sion (Friston et al., 2012). Several studies in animals and humans
have provided evidence that uncertainty or precision are en-
coded by slow fluctuations in DA neuron activity within and
across trials (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011; Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Schwartenbeck et al., 2014). It has been suggested (Corlett
et al., 2011; Friston, 2005b) that DA and other neuromodulators
may serve to implement the precision-weighting of PEs that
arises from Bayesian models under Gaussian assumptions (Fris-
ton et al., 2012; Mathys et al., 2011; Rao and Ballard, 1999)
(Figure 5). Empirically, a recent fMRI study demonstrated that
trial-by-trial midbrain activity reflected precision-weighted PEs
about visual stimuli (Iglesias et al., 2013) (see Figure 6).
Uncertainty has also been a major theme in theories about
other neuromodulatory transmitters. An influential proposal by
Yu and Dayan (2005) posited that ACh and NE levels may repre-
sent ‘‘expected uncertainty’’ (EU; known/estimated unreliability
of a prediction) and ‘‘unexpected uncertainty’’ (UU; induced by
a change of the environment), respectively. Empirical evidence
was obtained by recent fMRI studies (Figure 6) that showed
that model-based indices of EU were linked to trial-wise activity
in the cholinergic basal forebrain (Iglesias et al., 2013), while UU
was found to correlate with activity of the noradrenergic locus
coeruleus (Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013).Application to Clinical Questions
So far, computational models of neuromodulation in schizo-
phrenia have largely focused on abnormal DA signaling and its
potential role in delusion formation. One influential idea is that
dysregulated activity of DA neurons might result in PE signals
that are ill-timed and/or of abnormal precision, leading to erro-
neous attribution of importance (‘‘aberrant salience’’) to random
or irrelevant events (Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003). This induces
ongoing violations of the individual’s model of the world such
that, eventually, only the compensatory adoption of complicated
and seemingly bizarre beliefs can lead to cognitive resolution
(Corlett et al., 2010;Roiser et al., 2013). Thismay rest onan imbal-
ance of precision, where abnormally high precision of PE signals
(aberrant salience) at lower levels of the inference hierarchy dom-
inates over relatively low precision of predictions at higher levels;
under this perspective, the subsequent adoption of extremely
rigid (high precision) beliefs that become visible as delusions
may represent a compensatory response (Adams et al., 2013).
A prediction of the ‘‘aberrant salience’’ theory is that patients
with schizophrenia should show a diminished difference in PE re-
sponses to relevant and neutral stimuli. This hypothesis has been
tested by several computational fMRI studies using RL models
and conditioning paradigms in patients with schizophrenia (Gra-
din et al., 2011; Murray et al., 2008; Romaniuk et al., 2010) and
individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis (Roiser et al., 2013).
Despite differences in tasks, models, and clinical groups, these
studies indeed point to abnormal PE responses in midbrain
and ventral striatum (Figure 7): overall, in patients, PEs elicited
less activity on both rewarding or aversive trials, butmore activity
in response to neutral or irrelevant cues. Additionally, midbrain
PE responses correlated with psychotic symptom ratings
(Gradin et al., 2011; Romaniuk et al., 2010). Finally, abnormal
midbrain activity in patients with first-episode schizophrenia
has also been reported for other aspects of associative learning
(Corlett et al., 2007).
A recent study by Horga et al. (2014) used a PE-dependent
learning model to investigate another key symptom of psycho-
sis, auditory hallucinations. Previous fMRI studies demonstrated
auditory cortex activation during auditory hallucinations, in the
absence of external stimuli (Dierks et al., 1999). From a predictive
coding perspective, this points to overly precise and rigid priors
that induce misinterpretations of noisy baseline activity in audi-
tory cortex (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Friston, 2005b). This idea
was tested by Horga et al. (2014) in patients with schizophrenia
compared to healthy controls. Probabilistically varying the
absence and presence of auditory stimuli (voices) and modeling
trial-wise fMRI responses as a weighted mixture of predictions
and PEs, they found that patients with hallucinations showed
reduced PE signals in a voice-sensitive region of secondary
auditory cortex and, at the same time, increased activity during
silent trials. Both abnormalities varied with the individual severity
of hallucinations, but not other symptoms. These findings do not
directly prove but are consistent with the notion of rigid priors at
higher auditory levels that have become impervious to update re-
quirements signaled by PEs and evoke percepts during silence.
It is possible, but presently speculative, that this represents a
maladaptive response to initial PE abnormalities, similar as dis-
cussed for delusions above.Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 725
Figure 7. Model-Based fMRI Studies of Neuromodulation in Patients with Schizophrenia versus Controls
Figures are reproduced, with permission from the respective publishers. Please see individual papers for significance levels.
(A and B) During instrumental conditioning, patients showed reduced midbrain PE responses on reward trials (A) and augmented PE responses to neutral cues
(Murray et al., 2008) (B). A similar paradigm found a trend to reduced PE activity in the midbrain (MB) of patients. Decreases in PE activity correlated with severity
of psychotic symptoms in MB, right insula (RIn) and amygdala-hippocampus (RA-H) (Gradin et al., 2011).
(C) Patients’ midbrain activation to neutral stimuli versus fearful stimuli during aversive conditioning correlated significantly with delusional symptoms (Romaniuk
et al., 2010).
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Intuitively, the potential diagnostic utility of amodel increases the
more detailed its representations of biological mechanisms and
the more accurately estimates of these mechanisms can be ob-
tained in individual patients. However, these desiderata oppose
each other: the more detailed and biologically realistic a model,
the greater the challenges of parameter estimation and the
danger of overfitting. How do the approaches discussed in this
paper fare with regard to this general trade-off?
BNMs have introduced an innovative treatment of whole-
brain neuroimaging data, based on detailed representations of
neuronal mechanisms. Despite careful abstractions, estimating
most of these mechanisms from empirical data is presently not
possible, due to various reasons. First, an issue affecting models
of fMRI in general is that the low-pass filtering property of neuro-
vascular coupling restricts identifiability to mechanisms that are
expressed in a relatively low-frequency domain. Second, in
BNMs, the large number of parameters and their ubiquitous
inter-dependencies represent difficult numerical challenges for
system identification. This requires fixing most parameters to a
priori values. Parameters encoding connection strengths repre-
sent a particular problem because different configurations of
effective connectivity can lead to extremely different dynamic re-
gimes, and there are no simple rules for deducing effective con-
nectivity from anatomical nor functional connectivity. Although
the common assumption that synaptic weights are proportional
to anatomical connection strengths (as obtained from individual
DWI data) is a helpful first approximation, anatomical connectiv-
ity only constrains but does not determine effective connectivity.
This is because connection strengths change dynamically at
short timescales, under the influence of synaptic plasticity and726 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.neuromodulation (Stephan et al., 2008). Deco et al. (2013b) intro-
duced a free parameter that scales functional coupling strength
globally. This parameter has an indiscriminative effect on all con-
nections; by contrast, cognitive processes invoke selective
changes in subsets of long-range connections. A final challenge
is the substantial variability in neurovascular coupling across
brain regions and across subjects. Assuming fixed hemody-
namic parameters across regions may confound identification
of neuronal mechanisms from fMRI data (Valdes-Sosa et al.,
2011).
Some of thesemethodological issues are addressed by gener-
ativemodels, such as DCM. These adopt a simplermathematical
characterization of neuronal dynamics and are restricted to
smaller circuits. While their parameters can still be numerous,
they are constrained by priors; this enables computing the poste-
rior distribution of the parameters (model inversion). This should
not be confused with point estimates of parameters as obtained,
for example, in BNMs that optimize the correlation between
observed and predicted BOLD functional connectivity) (Deco
et al., 2013b). Importantly, the regularization afforded by priors
avoids overfitting and reduces identifiability issues, enabling
one to estimate both neuronal parameters and region-specific
hemodynamics in individual subjects. There are, however, non-
trivial issues for the inversion of current DCMs, such as local
extrema during optimization or the choice of priors; see Dauni-
zeau et al. (2011) for discussion. These methodological chal-
lenges have inspired ongoing developments for DCM, such as
global optimization schemes and empirical Bayesian procedures
for a ‘‘data-driven’’ choice of priors.
The physiological interpretability of model parameters in DCM
for fMRI is limited, given the relatively abstract state equations.
Figure 8. Graphical Summary of the
Translational Neuromodeling Strategy
Outlined in This Paper
Panel 1 adapted, with permission, from Chen et al.
(2009).
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synaptic transmission (excitatory versus inhibitory), and synaptic
plasticity is only characterized phenomenologically (as a change
in connection strength). By contrast, M/EEG data contain much
richer temporal information than fMRI, allowing for representa-
tion of different types of neurons and postsynaptic receptors.
This enables a finer characterization of pathophysiological pro-
cesses, such as E-I balance or DA modulation of glutamatergic
synapses, under suitable pharmacological challenges (Moran
et al., 2011a, 2011b). While this indicates promising potential
for treatment predictions, a major future challenge for clinical
utility will be to develop models that can disambiguate different
neuromodulatory mechanisms from M/EEG data in the absence
of designed pharmacological perturbations.
Given that both BNMs and DCMsmove toward the same goal,
but from different ends of the complexity spectrum, it is not
surprising to see signs of methodological rapprochement. For
example, there are efforts to extend DCMs to larger networks,
while preserving the capability of model inversion (Seghier and
Friston, 2013). For BNMs, one of the most important future
developments concerns parameter estimation; at present, only
very few BNMs possess free parameters at all (Deco et al.,
2013b; Freyer et al., 2011) and these are of a global and physio-
logically unspecific nature. As discussed recently (Deco and
Kringelbach, 2014; Woolrich and Stephan, 2013), this might be
improved by turning BNMs into fully generative models. For
example, importing model inversion and comparison proce-
dures from DCM might allow for obtaining connection-specific
parameter estimates, for resolving uncertainty about model
structure (e.g., connectivity layout) and for detecting overfitting.
Overall, it is likely that we will see a convergence of BNM and
DCM in the future. This will need to be complemented by compu-
tational perspectives, describing how circuit architecture
gives rise to specific computations. For BNMs and DCMs,
so far only very simple ‘‘neurocomputational’’ models exist;
for example, inferring short-term plasticity from trial-wise PE-
dependent changes in effective connectivity (den Ouden et al.,
2009). An important goal is to obtain generative models thatNeuron 87predict both measured brain activity
and behavior from the same underlying
neuronal state equations (Rigoux and
Daunizeau 2015; Wiecki and Frank 2013).
Translational Neuromodeling
The examples discussed in this article
illustrate how computational neuroimag-
ing can contribute to unraveling patho-
physiological mechanisms in schizo-
phrenia. However, direct demonstrations
of diagnostic utility do not exist so far.
One reason is that the vast majority ofstudies to date have contrasted patients with schizophrenia (as
defined by DSM) to controls or other patient groups. This does
not address the spectrum nature of schizophrenia with the likely
existence of different pathophysiological pathways that underlie
the variability in clinical trajectories and treatment responses
across patients (Krystal and State, 2014). Establishing models
that can distinguish between DSM-defined patient groups only
recapitulates the current diagnostic categories—with their lack
of predictive validity (Casey et al., 2013; Cuthbert and Insel,
2013)—but using a considerably more expensive approach
than conventional clinical interviews. Instead, psychiatry needs
approaches that allow for inference on disease mechanisms in
individual patients and a stratification of patients according to
pathophysiological types with predictive validity (Kapur et al.,
2012). In brief: we need tools and strategies for dissecting the
spectrum.
Provided the methodological issues discussed above can be
addressed, it might become possible to establish computational
assays with a similarly important role for differential diagnosis in
psychiatry as biochemical assays in internal medicine; cf. Ste-
phan et al. (2006). However, we do not wish to claim that this
is a panacea for psychiatry; additionally, various pitfalls exist
and will need to be addressed carefully. In this final section,
we consider some of these issues and outline strategic aspects
for translational neuromodeling (Figure 8). For simplicity,
we adopt a categorical perspective and assume distinct
pathophysiological subgroups in spectrum diseases. However,
model-based differential diagnosis can be equally approached
from a dimensional perspective; see Brodersen et al. (2014) for
discussion.
Basic Validation Studies
Candidate models for clinical applications should pass basic
validation studies. For example, face validity should be exam-
ined in initial simulation studies, probing whether the model
can recover known system structure and parameter values
from noisy data (Havlicek et al., 2011; Stephan et al., 2008). Eval-
uating predictive validity requires experimental perturbations,, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 727
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well-defined experimental manipulation, e.g., a selective phar-
macological intervention. For example, previous studies have
challenged DCM to identify, from fMRI data, the source of epilep-
tiform activity as established by invasive recordings (David et al.,
2008), or to detect the consequences of changes in anesthesia
levels and application of selective drugs, respectively (Moran
et al., 2011a, 2011b). Animal studies play an important role for
model validation since they allow for more controlled and spe-
cific test scenarios, including highly selective perturbation tech-
niques like optogenetics or ‘‘Designer Receptors Exclusively
Activated by Designer Drugs’’ (DREADDS).
Despite their importance, predictive validation studies of
computational models are rare. As it is often prohibitively diffi-
cult, slow, and expensive to acquire experimental data for model
validation from scratch, it will be crucial to establish open data-
sets with well-defined perturbations of physiological processes.
Such datasets would greatly speed up model development and
allow one to assess at an early stage the sensitivity and speci-
ficity of a candidate computational assay for detecting known
physiological states in individual subjects.
Strategies for Identifying Patient Subgroups
Following initial model validation, model-based detection of
pathophysiological subgroups in a spectrum disease could pro-
ceed in two different ways. If theories predict the nature of sub-
groups in advance and suitable models of subgroup-specific
mechanisms exist, subgroup assignment can be formulated as
a model selection problem. That is, in each individual patient,
the plausibility of competing models is evaluated (in terms of
model evidence), and the patient is assigned to the subgroup
associated with the most likely model. A compelling example,
albeit in a non-clinical spectrum of synesthetic subjects, is pro-
vided by van Leeuwen et al. (2011).
In psychiatric spectrum diseases like schizophrenia, however,
we usually do not know how many subgroups exist and what
(combination of) mechanismsmay define them. Here, subgroups
can be identified using an unsupervised variant of ‘‘generative
embedding’’ (Brodersen et al., 2011, 2014). This approach ap-
plies the same generative model to each subject’s data sepa-
rately and uses the resulting posterior densities for subsequent
unsupervised learning (clustering). In other words, the model is
used as a theory-guided dimensionality reduction device that
creates a de-noised and mechanistically interpretable feature
space. Compared to conventional approaches, such as classi-
fying patients on the basis of functional connectivity, generative
embedding has shown significantly higher performance in fMRI
studies on patients with stroke (Brodersen et al., 2011) and
schizophrenia (Brodersen et al., 2014). Notably, the latter study
identified three connectivity-defined subgroups in schizophrenia
that mapped onto significant differences in clinical symptom
scores.
When trying to derive subgroups through generative embed-
ding, one approach is to start with DSM categories in toto, as
in Brodersen et al. (2014). Alternatively, one can use behavioral
data or symptoms for identifying phenomenologically more ho-
mogenous subgroups within these broad spectra and proceed
withmodel-based inference on physiological mechanismswithin728 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.these subgroups (cf. Hyett et al., 2015). Finally, it is possible to
disregard physiological data altogether and define subgroups
based on generative modeling of behavioral data alone (Wiecki
et al., 2015).
Prospective Patient Studies
Once potential patient subgroups are identified, one needs to
verify that the proposed division has predictive validity with
regard to individual patients. This requires testing whether a
model-based assignment of individual patients to proposed sub-
groups results in clinically meaningful advances, that is, whether
it improves the physician’s ability to predict future clinical out-
comes and select optimal treatments for individual patients
(Figure 8). The importance of this validation in terms of clinical
utility cannot be overemphasized: regardless how perfect the
physiological validity of a given computational assay, if it does
not enable a differential diagnosis that improves predictions
and treatment choices for individual patients, it will have no
role in clinical practice. Critically, predictive validity of this sort
cannot be established in cross-sectional comparisons but re-
quires prospective designs with a focus on individual predictabil-
ity. In contrast to neuropsychological studies (Barch et al., 2003),
so far, prospective computational neuroimaging studies are
extremely rare (but see Anticevic et al., 2015; Iyer et al., 2015).
Potential Pitfalls
The success of translational neuromodeling will depend on our
ability to develop computational assays (of pathophysiological
or psychopathological) states that yield a real improvement in
clinical decision-making for individual patients, specifically
outcome predictions and treatment selection. In addition to the
technical challenges described above, however, several con-
ceptual and practical pitfalls loom. For example, a detected
abnormality of circuit parameters in patients may either reflect
a primary biological disease mechanism, or simply a different
cognitive process (e.g., task strategy) than assumed or in-
structed (Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). Furthermore, even when
the same task strategy is employed, differences observed
in patients may arise from unusual beliefs that have formed in
response to certain (perhaps unfortunate) experiences, while
the neuronal machinery itself is physiologically intact (cf. Mathys
et al., 2011). Disambiguating these possibilities is presently
rarely done, but can, in principle, be addressed by comparing
generative models of behavior that embody veridical versus
unusual beliefs about the task and its context.
Another potential problem is that even highly accurate model-
based pathophysiological inference may only allow for relatively
short-term predictions, given that the model is agnostic about
future environmental and biological perturbations (e.g., social
stress or infections) that may significantly impact on disease-
relevant brain circuits, not only by altering gene expression
but also synaptic plasticity directly. One could address this
by longitudinal neuroimaging measurements in single patients;
this, however, may introduce practical problems and render
the cost-benefit ratio unattractive. Alternatively, predictions by
a computational assay could be augmented (and updated
iteratively) by additional measurements that are more easily
and affordably obtained over time than neuroimaging but are
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include, for example, plasma levels of hormones and markers
of inflammation, but also behavioral readouts in individual pa-
tients. The latter are particularly attractive for longitudinal mea-
surements in individual patients as they can be obtained as
part of games designed for mobile devices (Rutledge et al.,
2014) and lend themselves to computational analysis, using
identical models (e.g., RL or Bayesian models) as those for neu-
roimaging data. Overall, this suggests that a more comprehen-
sive (and yet to be developed) modeling frameworkmay become
necessary—one where models derive and update clinical pre-
dictions by treating computational neuroimaging estimates of
an initial pathophysiological state as an ‘‘anchor’’ for subsequent
disease dynamics expressed by biochemical and behavioral
time series.
Open Datasets and Open Code
Prospective patient studies are essential for establishing the clin-
ical utility of candidate computational assays. However, these
studies are expensive, require close cooperation between
computational and biomedical scientists, and take years to com-
plete—this represents a serious bottleneck for translation and a
career risk for scientists depending on funding renewal. Similar
to physiological validation studies described above, there is an
urgent need for openly available datasets that can be used to
evaluate the potential clinical utility of models at an early devel-
opment stage and help resolve uncertainty about the most
promising directions. While laudable data sharing initiatives
have been established in the fMRI community, there is a lack
of data from prospective patient studies with clinically relevant
targets, such as treatment response, against which the diag-
nostic utility of candidate models can be benchmarked.
Another important desideratum is the sharing of source
code: this accelerates development and reduces errors by
providing standard building blocks and facilitates reproduction
of results. Following the success of open source packages for
‘‘classical’’ neuroimaging, this development is also gaining
ground in computational neuroimaging. Somemodels discussed
in this review are already available as open source code, e.g.,
in SPM (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), TAPAS (http://www.
translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas), and the Virtual Brain
platform (http://thevirtualbrain.org).
Conclusions
Choosing schizophrenia as an exemplary spectrum disease, this
article has outlined progress in computational neuroimaging
over the past decade, with a focus on generative or forward
models. While all modeling approaches have made impressive
advances and there is a promising trend of convergence, chal-
lenging technical and validation problems remain to be ad-
dressed in order to establish computational assays as candidate
clinical tools. Given successful physiological validation, a trans-
lational neuromodeling strategy for psychiatry foresees the use
of computational assays for spectrumdissection, where applica-
tion to patients of a conventionally defined disease (e.g., schizo-
phrenia) yields patient-specific vectors of model parameter esti-
mates and/or log-evidence for alternative disease mechanisms.
This quantitative profile could be used to delineate mechanisti-cally distinct patient subgroups. Establishing the validity of these
subgroup definitions requires prospective studies with regard to
clinically relevant outcome criteria, such as treatment response.
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